Hamas’s Post-Election Plans

http://www.thetrumpet.com/index.php?page=article&id=1980


With Palestinian parliamentary elections coming up next week, we take a look at the party with the most to gain.

Perhaps Hamas’s political goals appeared modest to start with. Recognizing that the push for democracy in the Middle East could be used to its advantage, Hamas sought to establish a political identity to offset the international pressure it is under by virtue of it being classed as a terrorist organization.

In reality, however, Hamas wants a political face as another weapon in its arsenal to fight its war against the existence of Israel.

Last year, through the course of several rounds of local elections in the Palestinian territories, Hamas’s political debut was phenomenally successful. For an organization that bases its existence on waging jihad against Israel to prove so popular appears to support the pronoucement of one Hamas leader: “This means that the people believe in the armed resistance as the only option.” At the least, Hamas’s suicide-bombing fame did nothing to diminish its popularity.

Though exploiting the political success, Hamas has been wary of tarnishing its terrorist credentials in the eyes of its Palestinian followers by appearing to go soft. Political participation could not be seen as accommodation with Israel. Hence, Hamas has been cautious of becoming too closely associated with the Palestinian National Authority (also referred to as the Palestinian Authority), whose leader, Mahmoud Abbas, seeks negotiation with the “enemy.”

However, in the wake of Hamas’s political success on the municipal level—and polls assuring significant wins on the parliamentary level (a Dec. 22, 2005, poll in the West Bank gave Hamas 40 percent of the vote, in contrast to just 20 percent for Fatah)—the terrorist organization has confirmed its intention to join the Palestinian National Authority (pna)—the administrative organization that currently governs Gaza and parts of the West Bank.

In an interview with the New York Times last Thursday (January 12), Hamas’s most senior leader within the Palestinian territories, Mahmoud Zahar, stated that Hamas seeks to form a broad-based coalition government in which all Palestinian factions are represented. In doing so, Hamas seeks to cooperate with the ruling Fatah party rather than to replace it, while keeping its own identity.

Why would Hamas (an acronym in Arabic for Islamic Resistance Movement) decide to throw in its lot with a political body it sees as compromising with Israel?

Its motive is true to form. Hamas is seeking such a political role to enhance its military role—most definitely not to replace it. How? Not only by defusing Israeli and international pressure for it to disarm, but possibly by institutionalizing Palestinian terrorism by bringing it under the umbrella of a national military force to defend the interests of a hoped-for Palestinian state—i.e., to fight against Israel.

Stratfor stated January 12 that Hamas “is no longer interested in simply transforming itself from a paramilitary organization into a political group with an armed wing …. Instead, it wants to go for the gold and become part of the Palestinian government and try to bypass the pressure to disarm” (emphasis ours throughout).

Stratfor predicts that Hamas will attempt to gain control over the Palestinian security forces by obtaining government positions in that arena—similar to what the Shiite Badr Brigades did in Iraq when they gained the Ministry of the Interior. In so doing, Hamas would be able to bypass disarmament pressures by signing up its militants to operate within the Palestinian security apparatus. Hamas “wants to see the formation of a national army comprising all existing militias” (ibid.). This army, said Zahar, would serve to protect Palestinians against what he described as Israeli incursions.

What would this mean for Israel?

If Hamas gained control over the Palestinian security forces, given the influence it already has over the various militant factions this “could lead to a more stable internal security situation within the Palestinian areas” (ibid.). That, in turn, would pose increased problems for Israel: The more united the Palestinian militants are, the bigger the threat.

At the same time, relative calm within Palestinian-controlled areas would only serve to increase international pressure on Israel to cede more territory to the Palestinians.

To confirm that Hamas’s fundamental goals will not change whatever the degree of its political success, Zahar stated in his interview that in the case of a win, in addition to refusing to disarm, Hamas still will not recognize Israel. He said that in a government with Hamas at the controls, all previous agreements made between Israel and the Palestinian Authority would be trashed.

Zahar also verified the fact that Hamas’s year-long informal truce was no more: “The calmness has ended,” Zahar stated—opening up the distinct possibility that attacks against Israel are on the cards for the near future. “We have the right to self-defense and to protect our people,” Zahar stated, not ruling out renewed attacks inside Israel proper.

So, here we have a terrorist organization that wants to remain as such—but be treated as a legitimate player in the international community. Its likely success can be foreseen by the passive acceptance of its entry into politics that has already occurred. By seeking not to undermine Fatah but to cooperate with Fatah to form a coalition government, Hamas wants to allay international concerns while maintaining its legitimacy domestically.

What’s more, by retaining its military capability—which has only been strengthened following Israel’s retreat from Gaza—Hamas will have the means to defend its political actions. Such a two-pronged strategy could well enhance Hamas’s ability to blackmail Israel. As Zahar himself stated (in what was actually described as a tempering of his opinions by the New York Times), “[R]esistance is not about guns alone.”

Whatever the outcome of the Palestinian elections, it will not be good news for Israel. Hamas is sure to gain some level of representation in a political entity that it seeks to remodel to its liking—a political institution fundamentally opposed to the Jewish state.

In fact, it appears Hamas already has a fair amount of influence within the Palestinian government, judging by Abbas’s complete failure to follow through on his commitment to disarm the terrorist organization. Perhaps Abbas is more dependent on Hamas than he would admit.

During the course of the New York Times interview referred to above, Mr. Abbas telephoned Hamas’s Zahar—to ascertain his opinion on a speech he had given a few days earlier. And what did Zahar have to say? The speech by this “great man” was “positive and acceptable.”

So much for rivalry between Fatah and Hamas. As Stratfor stated, the two political organizations appear to have reached an understanding: “They need each other to move toward statehood” (op. cit.).

We can be sure that Hamas’s gains will be exploited by Iran. Watch for Iran to strengthen its ties with Palestinian groups opposed to Israel. And then watch how events in the region coalesce to bring about the fulfillment of the biblical prophecy of the fall of half of Jerusalem.

For more on this pivotal event in end-time prophecy, read Jerusalem in Prophecy. What happens in this part of the world is going to intimately affect every one of us.

Gee that sounds almost like Conservative Leader, Stephen Harper's plans for Canada after tomorrow's Federal Election!!

Guess I'll have to vote for the Green Party after all..