In the summer of 1982, at the request of the Lebanese government, the United States agreed to establish a U.S. Military presence in that country to serve as a peacekeeping force in the conflict between warring Muslim and Christian factions. On March 24, 1983, the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, received orders to Beirut, Lebanon in support of that commitment.

In the early morning of October 23, 1983, the First Battalion, 8th Marines headquarters building was destroyed by a non-Lebanese, terrorist-driven truck laden with explosives. The resulting explosion and the collapse of the building killed 241 Marines, Sailors, and Soldiers. The loss of these brave men stunned the Jacksonville, North Carolina community.

Built through donations, the Beirut Memorial was dedicated October 23, 1986. A statue was added to the Memorial and dedicated October 22, 1988.

There are 273 names and the words “They Came In Peace” engraved on the walls of the Memorial. In addition to the inscribed names of those who died in Beirut and those who have died since of injuries from that blast, there are the names of three Marine pilots from the Jacksonville community that were killed in Grenada. Annually, an observance is held that includes the families of the deceased, military personnel and the civilian community.

The Beirut Memorial is located outside of the gate to the Marine Corps Combat Service Support Schools, Camp Johnson, North Carolina.




OCTOBER 23, 1983 - U.S. MARINE CORPS BARRACKS


CPL TERRY W. ABBOTT, USMC
LCPL CLEMON S. ALEXANDER, USMC
PFC JOHN R. ALLMAN, USMC
CPL MOSES J. ARNOLD JR., USMC
PFC CHARLES K. BAILEY, USMC
LCPL NICHOLAS BAKER, USMC
LCPL JOHANSEN BANKS, USMC
LCPL RICHARD E. BARRETT, USMC
HM1 RONNY K. BATES, USN
1STSGT DAVID L. BATTLE, USMC
LCPL JAMES R. BAYNARD, USMC
HN JESSE W. BEAMON, USN
GYSGT ALVIN BELMER, USMC
PFC STEPHEN BLAND, USMC
SGT RICHARD L. BLANKENSHIP, USMC
LCPL JOHN W. BLOCKER, USMC
CAPT JOSEPH J. BOCCIA JR., USMC
CPL LEON BOHANNON JR., USMC
SSGT JOHN R. BOHNET JR., USMC
CPL JOHN J. BONK JR., USMC
LCPL JEFFREY L. BOULOS, USMC
CPL DAVID R. BOUSUM, USMC
1STLT JOHN N. BOYETT, USMC
CPL ANTHONY BROWN, USMC
LCPL DAVID W. BROWN, USMC
LCPL BOBBY S. BUCHANAN JR., USMC
CPL JOHN B. BUCKMASTER, USMC
PFC WILLIAM F. BURLEY, USMC
HN JIMMY R. CAIN, USN
CPL PAUL L. CALLAHAN, USMC
SGT MECOT E. CAMARA, USMC
PFC BRADLEY J. CAMPUS, USMC
LCPL JOHNNIE D. CEASAR, USMC
PFC MARC L. COLE, USMC
SP4 MARCUS A. COLEMAN, USA
PFC JUAN M. COMAS, USMC
SGT ROBERT A. CONLEY, USMC
CPL CHARLES D. COOK, USMC
LCPL CURTIS J. COOPER, USMC
LCPL JOHNNY L. COPELAND, USMC
CPL BERT D. CORCORAN, USMC
LCPL DAVID L. COSNER, USMC
SGT KEVIN P. COULMAN, USMC
LCPL BRETT A. CROFT, USMC
LCPL RICK R. CRUDALE, USMC
LCPL KEVIN P. CUSTARD, USMC
LCPL RUSSELL E. CYZICK, USMC
MAJ ANDREW L. DAVIS, USMC
PFC SIDNEY S. DECKER, USMC
PFC MICHAEL J. DEVLIN, USMC
LCPL THOMAS A. DIBENEDETTO, USMC
PVT NATHANIEL G. DORSEY, USMC
SGTMAJ FREDERICK B. DOUGLASS, USMC
CPL TIMOTHY J. DUNNIGAN, USMC
HN BRYAN L. EARLE, USN
MSGT ROY L. EDWARDS, USMC
HM3 WILLIAM D. ELLIOT JR., USN
LCPL JESSE ELLISON, USMC
PFC DANNY R. ESTES, USMC
PFC SEAN F. ESTLER, USMC
HM3 JAMES E. FAULK, USN
PFC RICHARD A. FLUEGEL, USMC
CPL STEVEN M. FORRESTER, USMC
HM3 WILLIAM B. FOSTER JR., USN
CPL MICHAEL D. FULCHER, USMC
LCPL BENJAMIN E. FULLER, USMC
LCPL MICHAEL S. FULTON, USMC
CPL WILLIAM GAINES JR., USMC
LCPL SEAN R. GALLAGHER, USMC
LCPL DAVID B. GANDER, USMC
LCPL GEORGE M. GANGUR, USMC
SSGT LELAND E. GANN, USMC
LCPL RANDALL J. GARCIA, USMC
SSGT RONALD J. GARCIA, USMC
LCPL DAVID D. GAY, USMC
SSGT HAROLD D. GHUMM, USMC
LCPL WARNER GIBBS JR., USMC
CPL TIMOTHY R. GIBLIN, USMC
ETC MICHAEL W. GORCHINSKI, USN
LCPL RICHARD J. GORDON, USMC
LCPL HAROLD F. GRATTON, USMC
SGT ROBERT B. GREASER, USMC
LCPL DAVIN M. GREEN, USMC
LCPL THOMAS A. HAIRSTON, USMC
SGT FREDDIE HALTIWANGER JR., USMC
LCPL VIRGIL D. HAMILTON, USMC
SGT GILBERT HANTON, USMC
LCPL WILLIAM HART, USMC
CAPT MICHAEL S. HASKELL, USMC
PFC MICHAEL A. HASTINGS, USMC
CAPT PAUL A. HEIN, USMC
LCPL DOUGLAS E. HELD, USMC
PFC MARK A. HELMS, USMC
LCPL FERRANDY D. HENDERSON, USMC
SSGT JOHN HENDRICKSON, USMC
MSGT MATILDE HERNANDEZ JR., USMC
CPL STANLEY G. HESTER, USMC
GYSGT DONALD W. HILDRETH, USMC
SSGT RICHARD H. HOLBERTON, USMC
HM3 ROBERT S. HOLLAND, USN
LCPL BRUCE A. HOLLINGSHEAD, USMC
PFC MELVIN D. HOLMES, USMC
CPL BRUCE L. HOWARD, USMC
LT JOHN R. HUDSON, USN
CPL TERRY L. HUDSON, USMC
LCPL LYNDON J. HUE, USMC
2NDLT MAURICE E. HUKILL, USMC
LCPL EDWARD F. IACOVINO JR., USMC
PFC JOHN J. INGALLS, USMC
WO1 PAUL G. INNOCENZI III, USMC
LCPL JAMES J. JACKOWSKI, USMC
LCPL JEFFREY W. JAMES, USMC
LCPL NATHANIEL W. JENKINS, USMC
HM2 MICHAEL H. JOHNSON, USN
CPL EDWARD A. JOHNSTON, USMC
LCPL STEVEN JONES, USMC
PFC THOMAS A. JULIAN, USMC
HM2 MARION E. KEES, USN
SGT THOMAS C. KEOWN, USMC
GYSGT EDWARD E. KIMM, USMC
LCPL WALTER V. KINGSLEY, USMC
SGT DANIEL S. KLUCK, USA
LCPL JAMES C. KNIPPLE, USMC
LCPL FREAS H. KREISCHER III, USMC
LCPL KEITH J. LAISE, USMC
LCPL THOMAS G. LAMB, USMC
LCPL JAMES J. LANGON IV, USMC
SGT MICHAEL S. LARIVIERE, USMC
CPL STEVEN B. LARIVIERE, USMC
MSGT RICHARD L. LEMNAH, USMC
CPL DAVID A. LEWIS, USMC
SGT VAL S. LEWIS, USMC
CPL JOSEPH R. LIVINGSTON, USMC
LCPL PAUL D. LYON JR., USMC
MAJ JOHN W. MACROGLOU, USMC
CPL SAMUEL MAITLAND, USMC
SSGT CHARLIE R. MARTIN, USMC
PFC JACK L. MARTIN, USMC
CPL DAVID S. MASSA, USMC
SGT MICHAEL R. MASSMAN, USMC
PVT JOSEPH J. MATTACCHIONE, USMC
LCPL JOHN MCCALL, USMC
SGT JAMES E. MCDONOUGH, USMC
LCPL TIMOTHY R. MCMAHON, USMC
LCPL TIMOTHY D. MCNEELY, USMC
HM2 GEORGE N. MCVICKER II, USN
PFC LOUIS MELENDEZ, USMC
SGT RICHARD H. MENKINS II, USMC
CPL MICHAEL D. MERCER, USMC
LCPL RONALD W. MEURER, USMC
HM3 JOSEPH P. MILANO, USN
CPL JOSEPH P. MOORE, USMC
LCPL RICHARD A. MORROW, USMC
LCPL JOHN F. MUFFLER, USMC
CPL ALEX MUNOZ, USMC
CPL HARRY D. MYERS, USMC
1STLT DAVID J. NAIRN, USMC
LCPL LUIS A. NAVA, USMC
CPL JOHN A. OLSON, USMC
PFC ROBERT P. OLSON, USMC
CWO3 RICHARD C. ORTIZ, USMC
PFC JEFFREY B. OWEN, USMC
CPL JOSEPH A. OWENS, USMC
CPL CONNIE RAY PAGE, USMC
LCPL ULYSSES PARKER, USMC
LCPL MARK W. PAYNE, USMC
GYSGT JOHN L. PEARSON, USMC
PFC THOMAS S. PERRON, USMC
SGT JOHN A. PHILLIPS JR., USMC
HMC GEORGE W. PIERCY, USN
1STLT CLYDE W. PLYMEL, USMC
SGT WILLIAM H. POLLARD, USMC
SGT RAFAEL I. POMALESTORRES, USMC
CPL VICTOR M. PREVATT, USMC
PFC JAMES C. PRICE, USMC
SSGT PATRICK K. PRINDEVILLE, USMC
PFC ERIC A. PULLIAM, USMC
HM3 DIOMEDES J. QUIRANTE, USN
LCPL DAVID M. RANDOLPH, USMC
GYSGT CHARLES R. RAY, USMC
PFC RUI A. RELVAS, USMC
PFC TERRENCE L. RICH, USMC
LCPL WARREN RICHARDSON, USMC
SGT JUAN C. RODRIGUEZ, USMC
LCPL LOUIS J. ROTONDO, USMC
LCPL GUILLERMO SANPEDRO JR., USMC
LCPL MICHAEL C. SAULS, USMC
1STLT CHARLES J. SCHNORF, USMC
PFC SCOTT L. SCHULTZ, USMC
CAPT PETER J. SCIALABBA, USMC
CPL GARY R. SCOTT, USMC
CPL RONALD L. SHALLO, USMC
CPL THOMAS A. SHIPP, USMC
LCPL JERRYL D. SHROPSHIRE, USMC
LCPL JAMES F. SILVIA, USMC
LCPL LARRY H. SIMPSON JR., USMC
LCPL STANLEY J. SLIWINSKI, USMC
LCPL KIRK H. SMITH, USMC
SSGT THOMAS G. SMITH, USMC
CAPT VINCENT L. SMITH, USMC
LCPL EDWARD SOARES, USMC
1STLT WILLIAM S. SOMMERHOF, USMC
LCPL MICHAEL C. SPAULDING, USMC
LCPL JOHN W. SPEARING, USMC
LCPL STEPHEN E. SPENCER, USMC
LCPL BILL J. STELPFLUG, USMC
LCPL HORACE R. STEPHENS, USMC
PFC CRAIG S. STOCKTON, USMC
LCPL JEFFREY G. STOKES, USMC
LCPL THOMAS D. STOWE, USMC
LCPL ERIC D. STURGHILL, USMC
LCPL DEVON L. SUNDAR, USMC
LT JAMES F. SURCH JR., USN
CPL DENNIS A THOMPSON, USMC
SSGT THOMAS P. THORSTAD, USMC
PFC STEPHEN D. TINGLEY, USMC
LCPL JOHN J. TISHMACK, USMC
PVT LEX D. TRAHAN, USMC
PFC DONALD H. VALLONE JR., USMC
CPL ERIC R. WALKER, USMC
CPL LEONARD W. WALKER, USMC
CPL ERIC G. WASHINGTON, USMC
CPL OBRIAN WEEKES, USMC
1STSGT TANDY W. WELLS, USMC
LCPL STEVEN B. WENTWORTH, USMC
SGT ALLEN D. WESLEY, USMC
GYSGT LLOYD D. WEST, USMC
SSGT JOHN R. WEYL, USMC
CPL BURTON D. WHERLAND JR., USMC
LCPL DWAYNE W. WIGGLESWORTH, USMC
LCPL RODNEY J. WILLIAMS, USMC
GYSGT SCIPIO WILLIAMS JR., USMC
LCPL JOHNNY A. WILLIAMSON, USMC
CAPT WALTER E. WINT JR., USMC
CAPT WILLIAM E. WINTER, USMC
CPL JOHN E. WOLFE, USMC
1STLT DONALD E. WOOLLETT, USMC
HM3 DAVID E. WORLEY, USN
PFC CRAIG L. WYCHE, USMC
SFC JAMES G. YARBER, USA
SGT JEFFREY D. YOUNG, USMC
1STLT WILLIAM A. ZIMMERMAN, USMC

Four famous Marines now have their own postage stamps, the U.S. Postal Service recently announced:

http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2004/11/26/military/18_23_5211_25_04.txt

The stamps are of Basilone, "Chesty" Puller, Lejeune and Daly.

Although, Marines have lobbied for years for Marine stamps, I wonder if these stamps are meant in part to assuage another stamp initiative that the USPS will not address - the Beirut Peacekeeper's Stamp. See http://www.beirutstamp.com

I witnessed the devastation 1st hand in Beirut, and i will never forget it.

British forces that served there at the time, never even got a medal or mention. Certain units were allowed to add a bar to thier British Army Campaign Medal simply stating "Lebanon".

It was a very down played posting, but very nasty, and violent.

Thanks for posting the memorial and the names of the fallen at Beruit.

I too, was there. On board the USS Tarawa.

Semper Fi
The Gunny

My Judo coach was there in 83, JOCS Ciokon. He was a Sailor and a journalist. It was by fate that he is alive today. For some unknown reason, he changed his routine that morning and that change saved his life.

MIDDLE EAST HISTORY

IT HAPPENED IN MARCH


Israel Charged With Systematic Harassment of
U.S. Marines

By Donald Neff

MARCH 1995

It was 12 years ago, on March 14, 1983, that the commandant of the Marine Corps sent a highly unusual letter to the secretary of defense expressing frustration and anger at Israel. General R.H. Barrow charged that Israeli troops were deliberately threatening the lives of Marines serving as peacekeepers in Lebanon. There was, he wrote, a systematic pattern of harassment by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) that was resulting in "life-threatening
situations, replete with verbal degradation of the officers, their uniform and country."

Barrow's letter added: "It is inconceivable to me why Americans serving in peacekeeping roles must be harassed, endangered by an ally...It is evident to me, and the opinion of the U.S. commanders afloat and ashore, that the incidents between the Marines and the IDF are timed, orchestrated, and executed for obtuse Israeli political purposes."

Israel's motives were less obtuse than the diplomatic general pretended. It was widely believed then, and now, that Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, one of Israel's most Machiavellian politician-generals, was creating the incidents deliberately in an effort to convince Washington that the two forces had to coordinate their actions in order to avoid such tensions. This, of course, would have been taken by the Arabs as proof that the Marines were not really in Lebanon as neutral peacekeepers but as allies of the
Israelis, a perception that would have obvious advantages for Israel.

Barrow's extraordinary letter was indicative of the frustrations and miseries the Marines suffered during their posting to Lebanon starting on Aug. 25, 1982, as a result of Israel's invasion weeks earlier. Initially a U.S. unit of 800 men was sent to Beirut harbor as part of a multinational force to monitor the evacuation of PLO guerrillas from Beirut. The Marines, President Reagan announced, "in no case... would stay longer than 30 days." This turned out to be only partly true. They did withdraw on Sept. 10, but a reinforced unit of 1,200 was rushed back 15 days later after the massacres at the Palestinian refugee camps at Sabra and Shatila that accompanied the Israeli seizure of West Beirut.
The U.S. forces remained until Feb. 26, 1984.

During their-year-and-a-half posting in Lebanon, the Marines suffered 268 killed. The casualties started within a week of the return of the Marines in September 1982. On the 30th, a U.S.-made cluster bomb left behind by the Israelis exploded, killing Corporal David Reagan and wounding three other Marines.

Corporal Reagan's death represented the dangers of the new mission of the Marines in Lebanon. While their first brief stay had been to separate Israeli forces from Palestinian fighters evacuating West Beirut, their new mission was as part of a multinational force sent to prevent Israeli troops from attacking the Palestinian civilians left defenseless there after the withdrawal of PLO forces. As President Reagan said: "For this multinational force to succeed, it is essential that Israel withdraw from Beirut."

"Incidents are timed, orchestrated, and executed for Israeli political purposes."

Israel's siege of Beirut during the summer of 1982 had been brutal and bloody, reaching a peak of horror on Aug. 12, quickly known as Black Thursday. On that day, Sharon's forces launched at dawn a massive artillery barrage that lasted for 11 straight hours and was accompanied by saturation air bombardment. As many as 500 persons, mainly Lebanese and Palestinian civilians, were killed.

On top of the bombardment came the massacres the next month at Sabra and Shatila, where Sharon's troops allowed Lebanese Maronite killers to enter the camps filled with defenseless civilians. The massacres sickened the international community and
pressure from Western capitals finally forced Israel to withdraw from Beirut in late September. Troops from Britain, France, Italy and the United States were interposed between the Israeli army and Beirut, with U.S. Marines deployed in the most sensitive area south of Beirut at the International Airport, directly between Israeli troops and West Beirut.

It was at the airport that the Marines would suffer their Calvary over the next year. Starting in January 1983, small Israeli units began probing the Marine lines. At first the effort appeared aimed at discovering the extent of Marine determination to resist
penetration. The lines proved solid and the Marines' determination strong. Israeli troops were politely but firmly turned away. Soon the incidents escalated, with both sides pointing loaded weapons at each other but no firing taking place. Tensions were high
enough by late January that a special meeting between U.S. and Israeli officers was held in Beirut to try to agree on precise boundaries beyond which the IDF would not penetrate.

No Stranger to the Marines

However, on Feb. 2 a unit of three Israeli tanks, led by Israeli Lt. Col. Rafi Landsberg, tried to pass through Marine/Lebanese Army lines at Rayan University Library in south Lebanon. By this time, Landsberg was no stranger to the Marines. Since the beginning of January he had been leading small Israeli units in probes against the Marine lines, although such units would normally have a commander no higher than a sergeant or lieutenant. The suspicion grew that Sharon's troops were deliberately provoking the
Marines and Landsberg was there to see that things did not get out of hand. The Israeli tactics were aimed more at forcing a joint U.S.-Israeli strategy than merely probing lines.



In the Feb. 2 incident, the checkpoint was commanded by Marine Capt. Charles Johnson, who firmly refused permission for Landsberg to advance. When two of the Israeli tanks ignored his warning to halt, Johnson leaped on Landsberg's tank with pistol drawn and demanded Landsberg and his tanks withdraw. They did.

Landsberg and the Israeli embassy in Washington tried to laugh off the incident, implying that Johnson was a trigger-happy John Wayne type and that the media were exaggerating a routine event. Landsberg even went so far as to claim that he smelled alcohol on Johnson's breath and that drunkenness must have clouded his reason. Marines were infuriated because Johnson was well known as a teetotaler. Americans flocked to Johnson's side. He received hundreds of letters from school children, former Marines and from Commandant Barrow. It was a losing battle for the Israelis and Landsberg soon dropped from sight.

But the incidents did not stop. These now included "helicopter harassment," by which U.S.-made helicopters with glaring spotlights were flown by the Israelis over Marine positions at night, illuminating Marine outposts and exposing them to potential attack. As reports of these incidents piled up, Gen. Barrow received a letter on March 12 from a U.S. Army major stationed in Lebanon with the United Nations Truce Supervisory
Organization (UNTSO). The letter described a systematic pattern of Israeli attacks and provocations against UNTSO troops, including instances in which U.S. officers were singled out for "near-miss" shootings, abuse and detention. That same day two Marine
patrols were challenged and cursed by Israeli soldiers.

Two days later Barrow wrote his letter to Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, who endorsed it and sent it along to the State Department. High-level meetings were arranged and the incidents abated, perhaps largely because by this time Ariel Sharon had
been fired as defense minister. He had been found by an Israeli commission to have had "personal responsibility" for the Sabra and Shatila massacres.

Despite the bad taste left from the clashes with the Israelis, in fact no Marines had been killed in the incidents and their lines had been secure up to the end of winter in 1983. Then Islamic guerrillas, backed by Iran, became active. On the night of April 17, 1983, an unknown sniper fired a shot that went through the trousers of a Marine sentry but did not harm him. For the first time, the Marines returned fire.

The next day, the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was blown up by a massive bomb, with the loss of 63 lives. Among the 17 Americans killed were CIA Mideast specialists, including Robert C. Ames, the agency's top Middle East expert. Disaffected former Israeli
Mossad case officer Victor Ostrovsky later claimed that Israel had advance information about the bombing plan but had decided not to inform the United States, a claim denied by Israel. The Iranian-backed Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility. Veteran correspondent John Cooley considered the attack "the day [Iranian leader Ayatollah] Khomeini's offensive against America in Lebanon began in earnest."

Still, it was not until four months later, on Aug. 28, that Marines came under direct fire by rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons at International Airport. They returned fire with M-16 rifles and M-60 machine guns. The firefight resumed the next day with Marines firing 155mm artillery, 81mm mortars and rockets from Cobra helicopter gunships against Shi'I Muslim positions. Two Marines were killed and 14 wounded in the exchange, the first casualties in actual combat since the Marines had
landed the previous year.

From this time on, the combat involvement of the Marines grew. Their actions were generally seen as siding with Israel against Muslims, slowly changing the status of the Marines as neutral peacekeepers to opponents of the Muslims. Israel could hardly have wished for more. The polarization meant that increasingly the conflict was being perceived in terms of the U.S., Israel and Lebanon's Christians against Iran, Islam and Lebanon's Shi'I Muslims.

Accelerating the Conflict

Israel accelerated the building conflict on Sept. 3, 1983 by unilaterally withdrawing its troops southward, leaving the Marines exposed behind their thin lines at the airport. The United States had asked the Israeli government to delay its withdrawal until the Marines could be replaced by units of the Lebanese army, but Israel refused. The result was as feared. Heavy fighting immediately broke out between the Christian Lebanese Forces
and the pro-Syrian Druze units, both seeking to occupy positions evacuated by Israel, while the Marines were left in the crossfire. On Sept. 5, two Marines were killed and three wounded as fighting escalated between Christian and Muslim militias.

In an ill-considered effort to subdue the combat, the Sixth Fleet frigate Bowen fired several five-inch naval guns, hitting Druze artillery positions in the Chouf Mountains that were firing into the Marine compound at Beirut airport. It was the first time U.S. ships had fired into Lebanon, dramatically raising the level of combat. But the Marines' exposed location on the flat terrain of the airport left them in an impossible position. On Sept. 12, three more Marines were wounded.

On Sept. 13, President Reagan authorized what was called aggressive self-defense for the Marines, including air and naval strikes. Five days later the United States essentially joined the war against the Muslims when four U.S. warships unleashed the heaviest
naval bombardment since Vietnam into Syrian and Druze positions in eastern Lebanon in support of the Lebanese Christians. The bombardment lasted for three days and was personally ordered by National Security Council director Robert McFarlane, a
Marine Corps officer detailed to the White House who was in Lebanon at the time and was also a strong supporter of Israel and its Lebanese Maronite Christian allies. McFarlane issued the order despite the fact that the Marine commander at the airport, Colonel Timothy Geraghty, strenuously argued against it because, in the words of correspondent Thomas L. Friedman, "he knew that it would make his soldiers party to what was now clearly an intra-Lebanese fight, and that the Lebanese Muslims
would not retaliate against the Navy's ships at sea but against the Marines on shore."

By now, the Marines were under daily attack and Muslims were charging they were no longer neutral. At the same time the battleship USS New Jersey, with 16-inch guns, arrived off Lebanon, increasing the number of U.S. warships offshore to 14. Similarly, the Marine contingent at Beirut airport was increased from 1,200 to 1,600.

A Tragic Climax

The fight now was truly joined between the Shi'i Muslims and the Marines, who were essentially pinned down in their airport bunkers and under orders not to take offensive actions. The tragic climax of their predicament came on Oct. 23, when a Muslim guerrilla drove a truck past guards at the Marine airport compound and detonated an explosive with the force of 12,000 pounds of dynamite under a building housing Marines and other U.S. personnel. Almost simultaneously, a car-bomb exploded at the French compound in Beirut. Casualties were 241 Americans and 58 French troops killed. The bombings were the work of Hezbollah, made up of Shi'i Muslim guerrillas supported by Iran.

America's agony increased on Dec. 3, when two carrier planes were downed by Syrian missiles during heavy U.S. air raids on eastern Lebanon.33 On the same day, eight Marines were killed in fighting with Muslim militiamen around the Beirut airport.

By the start of 1984, an all-out Shi'i Muslim campaign to rid Lebanon of all Americans was underway. The highly respected president of the American University of Beirut, Dr. Malcolm Kerr, a distinguished scholar of the Arab world, was gunned down on Jan. 18 outside his office by Islamic militants aligned with Iran. On Feb. 5, Reagan made one of his stand-tall speeches by saying that "the situation in Lebanon is difficult, frustrating and dangerous. But this is no reason to turn our backs on friends and to cut and run."

The next day Professor Frank Regier, a U.S. citizen teaching at AUB, was kidnapped by Muslim radicals. Regier's kidnapping was the beginning of a series of kidnappings of Americans in Beirut that would hound the Reagan and later the Bush administrations for years and lead to the eventual expulsion of nearly all Americans from Lebanon where they had prospered for more than a century. Even today Americans still are prohibited from traveling to Lebanon.

The day after Regier's kidnapping, on Feb. 7, 1984, Reagan suddenly reversed himself and announced that all U.S. Marines would shortly be "redeployed." The next day the battleship USS New Jersey fired 290 rounds of one-ton shells from its 16-inch guns into Lebanon as a final act of U.S. frustration.38 Reagan's "redeployment" was completed by Feb. 26, when the last of the Marines retreated from Lebanon.

The mission of the Marines had been a humiliating failure--not because they failed in their duty but because the political backbone in Washington was lacking. The Marines had arrived in 1982 with all sides welcoming them. They left in 1984 despised by many
and the object of attacks by Muslims. Even relations with Israel were strained, if not in Washington where a sympathetic Congress granted increased aid to the Jewish state to
compensate it for the costs of its bungled invasion, then between the Marines and Israeli troops who had confronted each other in a real politic battlefield that was beyond their competence or understanding. The Marine experience in Lebanon did not contribute
toward a favorable impression of Israel among many Americans, especially since the Marines would not have been in Lebanon except for Israel's unprovoked invasion.

This negative result is perhaps one reason a number of Israelis and their supporters today oppose sending U.S. peacekeepers to the Golan Heights as part of a possible Israeli-Syrian peace treaty. A repeat of the 1982-84 experience would certainly not be in Israel's interests at a time when its supporters are seeking to have a budget-conscious Congress continue unprecedented amounts of aid to Israel.